Putin reacts to Syria’s ‘Doctor No’ - Michael Young- The Daily Star
There are many ways to try to explain the Russian decision to begin the withdrawal of its military from Syria. But only one is truly convincing. It was a warning to Bashar Assad that he doesn’t have an open account with Moscow, and that he has to get serious about the ongoing negotiations in Geneva.
To understand better what happened, it has to be viewed in light of the statements by Walid al-Moallem last Saturday, when the Syrian foreign minister did a fine impression of Andrei Gromyko. There would be no discussion of Assad or his future, Moallem insisted, because the president was a “red line.” Moreover, the United Nations envoy, Staffan de Mistura, had overstepped his mandate by talking about presidential elections in Syria.
In other words, the Syrian regime was about to send its team to Switzerland Monday to discuss nothing substantial, nor to really advance the Geneva-Vienna process. However, Russian credibility is tied to the success of that process.
In Vienna, the Russians had managed to push the Americans into not making Assad’s departure a prior condition for talks. The participants agreed to “a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué in its entirety.” This 2012 communiqué very clearly outlined a transition in Syria away from Assad, including the holding of free and fair elections.
Moallem was offering a very restricted reading of Geneva-Vienna, one in which the idea of a presidential election could not be imposed on Syria, as this was “an exclusive right of the Syrian people.” Given the great attention the Syrian regime has afforded the opinions of its own people, skeptics were right to regard his evasiveness as a maneuver to avoid committing to elections over which the regime might lose control.
Assad’s maximalism poses problems for the Russians, for whom the intervention in Syria was always about much more than Syria. To President Vladimir Putin, Russia’s role was something that could be leveraged to facilitate a major comeback on the international stage, as a main interlocutor of the United States. Through such superpower dialogue – if Russia can still be called a superpower – Putin could, like Donald Trump, make his country great again. Yet things would look decidedly less grand if the Assad regime, weakened and entirely dependent on Russian military assistance, could successfully tell the Russians and the Americans that their Syria plan was to be discarded.
The Russians have said that the Syrians were in on the withdrawal decision, but this was contradicted by reports that Putin had informed Assad about it over the telephone. Had there been consensus, both Moscow and Damascus would have announced the withdrawal jointly, to avoid the ambiguity that prevailed afterward. It’s almost certain that the Russian verdict was dropped on the Syrian leader without consultations, so the message would hit hard: If you play hardball, do it on your own, with the likelihood that you will ultimately lose your war.
The Russians want to shake Assad, but they certainly do not want to push him over the edge. That is why they will continue to operate the Hmeimim and Tartous bases, from where they can deploy if the Syrian regime comes under dire threat. Most interesting is that the cease-fire is still holding, despite some violations, when the conventional wisdom was that it would not. But will it continue to do so if the opposition perceives that Assad is more vulnerable thanks to the Russian drawdown?
Perhaps that’s precisely what Putin wanted to get across to Damascus. At best Assad can hang on to the territory he has, but thoughts of expanding his areas of control are out of the question. That is why the Syrian president’s hubristic promise in February to retake all of Syria must have angered Moscow. Who was going to help him do so? Certainly not Russia, Putin has just made clear. We’re not a blank check that Assad can write to himself, while surrendering nothing in return.
Which brings us back to the cease-fire. For now the Americans are holding their side, warning that if the Syrian opposition undermines the cease-fire, they will face the consequences. As for Assad, without Russian backing his ability to go on the offensive is diminished, creating frustration among regime supporters who had thought it possible to recapture Aleppo.
The withdrawal has allowed Putin to pull out some forces, with the advantages this brought him at home. It has also allowed Assad to better appreciate his limitations. Nor is he able to play Russia and Iran off against each other, since the Iranians, too, have no real urge to be drawn into the Syrian quagmire, and can only push their Hezbollah and Shiite allies so far. The Iranians have already pulled out combatants, and even if they are not pleased to see Russia playing a leading role in Syria, they are well aware that Assad’s perpetual obstruction can only prolong the conflict with no tangible benefits in return.
Assad is right to feel that he has become expendable, and that he has no means of imposing another outcome. The Russians will probably keep him on until they can effect a managed change that preserves their interests, while also enhancing their cooperation with the United States. That’s one explanation for the palpable uneasiness of Syrian officials these days.
The real question is whether Iran’s priorities in Syria will be taken into account in the event Assad steps down. Russia is probably not keen to allow the Islamic Republic to set up a new front against Israel on the Golan Heights. But Iran is more influential on the ground in Syria. An eventual compromise could be for Tehran to retain a passage through Syria to rearm its allies in Lebanon. But we’re ahead of ourselves. For now it’s up to Syria and Russia to work out their relationship.