How valuable an ally is Iran, really? - Michael Young - The Daily Star
After the recapture of Ramadi by Iraqi security forces, assisted by American-led air support, one has to wonder about Iran. Tehran has played a far from negligible role in defending regimes in Iraq and Syria, but has also seen outside powers, Russia and the United States, provide decisive assistance when it could not.
That’s hardly to say that Iran will soon be ignored in either country. It continues to hold veto power over key decisions in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. But time and again the Iranian model, if Iran’s influence can be called that, has also exposed its limitations, calling into question Tehran’s ability to secure its long-term interests in many countries of the region.
Perhaps that’s because Iran has largely played a game of divide and rule, often based on sectarianism, in a majority Sunni Arab world. If Arab states are fragmented, the ability to resist Iranian inroads into their affairs remains limited. At the same time Iran’s approach often hinders the imposition of durable institutions of control, leaving Iran’s local clients vulnerable.
This is similar to the template adopted by Syria in Lebanon for three decades. The Syrians successfully played on Lebanese divisions to enhance their power, and did so remarkably well for a long period of time. However, their allies were gradually discredited because of Syrian abuses. When, for a brief moment, most Sunnis, Christians and Druze were united against Syria in the aftermath of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s assassination, the edifice collapsed. Only Hezbollah – no Syrian creation – kept the walls in place to protect itself, gradually neutralizing its adversaries.
But Hezbollah’s example has only been imperfectly reproduced elsewhere. In Iraq, Tehran has relied on a combination of control over the central government and the ability to put in place a parallel structure of pro-Iranian Shiite militias to secure its hegemony. However, the net result has been a situation that has exacerbated sectarian tensions, allowing groups such as Daesh (ISIS) to seize territory, and that has encouraged the Kurds to seek substantial autonomy within the Iraqi state.
In Syria Tehran also created and trained militias after 2011 to help the regime of Bashar Assad, giving it a direct say in the conduct of military operations. Yet all this did was to slow down the disintegration of the army and security forces and engender corrupt armed gangs that lost the regime popular support. Yet in no way did the strategy contain the rebels, whose growing number of victories forced Russian intervention.
The Russians, unlike the Iranians, have made it clear that they seek to reinforce the Syrian state. There has been much talk lately that Syria may be permanently partitioned, but it’s not at all evident that Russia will ultimately allow this if Assad can consolidate himself in the coming year. The Russians are statists by conviction, and see no benefit in allowing Syria to fall apart. Reunification of the country may take time, but Russia and the United States appear to agree that it, not partition, must be the outcome of any process to end the war.
Militarily, the Iranians have doubtless helped, mainly through their Shiite proxies, but their shortcomings have also been evident. They have not used their air force in support of Assad; Iranian casualties in Syria have provoked a backlash at home, and in early December there were unconfirmed reports that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard were withdrawing from Syria; and even Hezbollah, while it played a vital role in bolstering Assad, has been unable to reverse the tide of regime defeats. Worse, the party failed even to capture Zabadani, where the battle ended through a cease-fire negotiated by the United Nations, after Iran and Turkey had secured short-term cease-fires earlier.
Iranian patchiness has also been apparent in Iraq. Iran mobilized Shiite militias to regain territory from Daesh last year, with Qasem Soleimani appearing in photographs alongside militia leaders in Diyala province. Yet the militias did more harm than good by engaging in sectarian killings, which only alienated Sunnis further and reinforced Daesh. This greatly harmed the credibility of Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.
That is why Ramadi was done differently. The militias did not play a major role in the battle and the Iraqi government agreed to establish a force of Sunni tribesmen to control the city after it was recaptured. In exchange Baghdad received air support that proved essential in helping the Iraqi forces advance through the city. This will have a bearing on the operation to retake Fallujah, and the effectiveness of the Sunni force in Ramadi will be watched closely by Sunnis in other parts of Iraq.
Assad, too, can draw his lessons. Preceded by relentless Russian aerial bombardment, his forces have regained ground in several parts of Syria. His main foe near Damascus, Zahran Alloush, was killed by Russian bombing. Where the Iranians helped his regime to survive, the Russians have allowed his forces to regain the initiative. Moscow seems to have a military strategy to revitalize him, while Iran’s in many ways kept the Syrian leader in place, but also on permanent life support.
Iran will retain a say over Syria’s and Iraq’s future and cannot be dismissed. However, with parliamentary elections coming in February, the missteps of the Revolutionary Guard may feed into Iranian domestic politics. They could also have repercussions in Arab capitals allied with Iran. Rather than accept the domination of a state whose effectiveness is often in question, they may be tempted to align more with states outside the region who give them greater latitude to be themselves.
Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR. He tweets @BeirutCalling.